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Abstract
A 1993 survey on the innovative activities of Europe’s largest industrial firms obtained useable results on patenting
activities for 604 respondents. The data are used to calculate the sales-weighted propensity rates for 19 industries. The
propensity rates equal the percentage of innovations for which a patent application is made. The propensity rates for product
innovations average 35.9%, varying between 8.1% in textiles and 79.2% in pharmaceuticals. The average for process
innovations is 24.8%, varying from 8.1% in textiles to 46.8% for precision instruments. Only four sectors have patent
propensity rates, for both product and process innovations combined, that exceed 50%: pharmaceuticals, chemicals,
machinery, and precision instruments. Regression results that control for the effect of industry sector show that patent
propensity rates increase with firm size and are higher among firms that find patents to be an important method for
preventing competitors from copying both product and process innovations. The effect of secrecy is not so straightforward.
Firms that find secrecy to be an important protection method for product innovations are less likely to patent, as expected,
but secrecy has little effect on the propensity to patent process innovations. The R&D intensity of the firm has no effect on
patent propensity rates for both product and process innovations. The sector of activity has a strong influence on product
patent propensities but very little effect on process patent propensities, after controlling for the effect of other factors.
q1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The patent propensity rate is a potentially valu-
able indicator for both innovative activities and ap-
propriation conditions. Several definitions are in use,
) Corresponding author. E-mail: a.arundel@merit.unimaas.nl.
which permit different interpretations of what patent-
ing denotes in terms of innovative activity and ap-
propriation conditions. The first definition was intro-
. duced by Scherer 1965, 1983 who defines patent
propensity as the number of patents per unit of
expenditure on R&D. This definition is complex to
interpret because it is influenced by the efficiency of
R&D, the reasons why firms patent, and other fac-
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tors such as technological opportunities. Neverthe-
less, a main advantage of this measure is that it can
be calculated for a large number of countries that
provide public statistics on R&D expenditures and
the number of patents over time. Grefermann et al.
. . 1974 and Kabla 1996 use a relatively restrictive
definition consisting of the percentage of innovative
firms in a sector that have applied for at least one
patent over a defined time period. This can be used
to measure the occurrence of some patenting activity
among small firms, but this indicator is of less value
for large manufacturing firms, almost all of which
have applied for at least one patent. Licht and Zoz
. 1996 use a similar measure defined at the firm
level in a study of the factors that influence a firm to
patent one or more innovations.
Several definitions of the patent propensity rate
derive from the use of percentage of patentable
. inventions that are patented by Mansfield 1986 .
The term ‘patentable’ refers to the legal requirement
for an invention to meet novelty, non-obviousness,
and industrial application criteria. Mansfield’s defini-
tion is of particular value for research into appropria-
tion conditions because it measures differences in the
reasons why firms choose to patent an invention,
with no interference from the productivity of R&D
in terms of the number of innovations produced per
unit of R&D expenditure. An extension of Mans-
field’s definition is the percentage of innoÍations,
rather than inventions, that are patented. This over-
comes one of the drawbacks of Mansfield’s defini-
tion, which is that many inventions are never com-
mercialised and hence have little economic value.
This disadvantage is magnified by the fact that a
single patent, although it does not necessarily corre-
spond to one invention, is even less likely to corre-
spond to one innovation. This could result in large
discrepancies between the percentage of patented
inventions versus patented innovations. For example,
. research by Acs and Audretsch 1988 shows that the
number of patents per innovation can vary substan-
tially, ranging by industrial sector from an average of
49 to 0.6 patents per innovation.
Estimates of the percentage of inventions or inno-
vations that are patented, either by themselves or
linked to other aspects of patenting strategies, can
provide useful information for R&D managers,
economists, and policy makers. For example, the
effectiveness of changes to patent legislation to make
patenting easier, and thereby either entice firms to
patent a higher percentage of their innovations or
even to invest more in innovation, should not be
taken for granted. Such changes, for example, to
reduce the cost of a patent application, could in-
crease patent propensity rates in some sectors that
currently have low rates while having little effect on
firms or sectors where a majority of innovations are
already patented. Similarly, the European Commis-
 sion’s Green Paper on InnoÍation European Com-
. mission, 1996 proposes policies to encourage firms
to make more use of patent databases as a source of
technical information. Yet the value of such databases
to a firm partly depends on the propensity to patent
in those sectors that are a source of useful technical
information for the firm’s innovative activities. The
technical information available in patent databases
 will be comparatively sparse if few innovations or
. inventions in the relevant sectors are patented.
Another issue is whether or not patents can be
used to measure changes in inventive activity over
. time. The data presented by Grilliches 1990 show
that the number of domestic patent applications in
the US between 1880 and 1989 has increased much
more slowly than real GNP and investment, although
there has been a sharp increase in the number of
patent applications and grants in the US in the late
. 1980s and early 1990s Kortum and Lerner, 1997 .
Any investigation of the technical or economic causes
of these changes must first deal with the possibility
that they are due to changes in the percentage of
inventions or innovations that are patented. Evenson
. 1993 , for instance, discounts changes in such patent
propensity rates in an analysis of a decline in the
number of patents per scientific and engineering
employee in the US, the UK, Germany and France
between 1970 and 1990. He assumes that changes in
patent propensity rates will affect all sectors equally
and can therefore be safely discounted. We would
argue that this is not necessarily a safe assumption,
since other factors that can vary by sector over time,
such as appropriation conditions or the intensity of
competition, could lead to different rates of change
in sectoral patent propensity rates.
. Kortum and Lerner 1997 explore several expla-
nations for the rise in patenting activity in the US
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patent propensity in response to legislative changes
in 1982 that strengthened the ability of patents to
prevent infringement, an increase in technological
opportunities, greater productivity of R&D, and a
shift to more applied research, which would lead to
more patentable inventions. Their results show that
an increase in patent propensity could theoretically
explain the recent increase in patenting, but they
argue that other factors related to technology, such as
an improvement in innovation management, are more
likely to explain the recent increase in patenting
activity.
These studies on changes in patenting over time
highlight the complexity of the factors that influence
the relationship between patents and inventive activ-
ity. They also point to the need to establish baseline
rates for patent propensity for future comparisons
and the need to further our understanding of the
major factors that influence the propensity to patent.
Good evidence has been available for some time,
based on surveys of firms in the US and in Europe,
that the percentage of innovations that are patented
should vary by sector because of differences in the
value of patents as a means of appropriating invest-
 ments in innovation Levin et al., 1987; Arundel et
. al., 1995; Harabi, 1995 . Patents are of greatest value
in a few sectors such as pharmaceuticals, chemicals,
and machinery, where the cost of copying an innova-
tion is considerably less than the initial cost of
invention. In contrast, patents are relatively unimpor-
tant compared to alternative appropriation methods
such as lead time advantages or technical complexity
in sectors that produce complex products that are
costly to copy, or where high investment costs and
expertise levels create entry barriers that limit com-
petition from new entrants, such as in aerospace.
These differences in the usefulness of patents strongly
suggest that there should also be large sectoral dif-
ferences in patent propensity rates. Furthermore,
given the importance of lead time advantages and
concern over disclosure, we would expect many
innovations not to be patented. This expectation is
supported by the theoretical models of Horstman et
. . al. 1985 and Harter 1993 , which show that the
propensity to patent should lie between 0 and 1
because of the effect on a firm’s patenting strategies
of the disclosure of different types of information to
competitors.
We are aware of five studies, all based on surveys
of firms,
1 that have reported some results for the
propensity to patent inventions or innovations. The
. study of Mansfield 1986 gives results for 96 Amer-
ican manufacturing firms in the early 1980s. Approx-
imately 84% of patentable inventions over a three-
year period were patented in five sectors where
patents are an important incentive for innovation.
The patent propensity in six sectors where patents
were relatively unimportant was 66%. Both of these
estimates were weighted by the firm’s sales. Taylor
. and Silberston 1973 report similar high patenting
rates in the UK, though based on fewer firms, and
the results of both studies suggest that patent propen-
. sity increases with firm size. An EPO 1994 survey
of European firms with less than 1000 employees
and which had applied for at least one patent reports
that 50% of 1006 responding firms applied for a
patent for over 50% of their patentable inventions.
Unfortunately, the report does not provide more
detailed results such as point estimates or results by
sector or firm size. The results are also biased by
excluding firms that did not apply for a patent. The
largest survey so far for the United States is by
. Cohen et al. 1996 who give preliminary patent
propensity rates for innovations, weighted by R&D
expenditures, for a survey of 1065 American re-
search laboratories in manufacturing. They report
that a patent application was made for 51.5% of
product innovations and for 33.0% of process inno-
vations between 1991 and 1993.
The fifth survey, consisting of a joint survey by
MERIT in the Netherlands and SESSI in France,
2
forms the basis of this study. Previous econometric
analyses of the propensity to patent product innova-
tions, using a part of this data, show that German
1 Another method for determining patent propensity rates is to
identify all major innovations, for example, by using new product
announcements in trade and technical journals. One could then
determine the percentage of these that were patented. There are no
studies so far that have used this method, although two studies
have obtained data on both product announcements and the num-
 ber of patents held by each firm Acs and Audretsch, 1988;
. Devinny, 1993 .
2 SESSI is the Statistical Service of the French Ministry of
Industry. The survey was conducted in collaboration with the
. National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies INSEE ,
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firms patent a higher proportion of their product
innovations than firms in the UK, France, or other
European countries
3 and that concern over the ease
of imitation and information disclosure reduces the
 propensity to patent Arundel and Kabla, forthcom-
. ing; Duguet and Kabla, forthcoming .
The purpose of the study reported here is to use
the MERITrSESSI data to provide empirical esti-
mates of the propensity to patent both product and
process innovations, by industrial sector, and to fur-
ther explore the effect of firm-specific factors that
influence the propensity to patent both types of
innovations. The results show that patent propensity
rates in Europe in the early 1990s are considerably
lower than the rates estimated by Mansfield for the
US in the early 1980s and slightly lower than the
rates reported by Cohen et al. for a comparable time
period as the MERITrSESSI study. Furthermore, a
few firm-specific factors, other than the sector of
activity, influence the patent propensity rate. These
factors include firm size, which is positively related
to the propensity to patent both product and process
innovations, the importance of patents and secrecy to
prevent copying by competitors, and sales in markets
outside of Europe.
2. Methodology
In 1993, MERIT in the Netherlands and SESSI in
France, in collaboration with INSEE, conducted par-
allel surveys on the innovative activities of European
firms. The MERIT survey, called PACE, was mailed
to 1270 research directors from the European Union’s
500 largest R&D performing industrial firms, ex-
cluding firms based in France. Separate PACE ques-
tionnaires were mailed to an average of 2.4 R&D
managers within each firm, with the number sent to
each firm depending on its size and number of lines
of business. In France, questionnaires were sent to
2622 manufacturing firms with more than 50 em-
ployees. Contrary to PACE, the French survey was
3 No satisfactory explanation for this result could be found. It
was not due to differences in the industrial distribution, the size of
German firms, or to the policy of German firms to give financial
rewards to inventors. Two possible though untested explanations
are a pro-patent business culture or a greater R&D efficiency
among German firms.
only sent to the main R&D director of each legally
established firm. This meant that only firms that had
established their divisions as legally defined separate
units were sampled more than once. A common
database was constructed based upon the PACE data
and a comparable sample from the SESSI results,
limited to 200 firms in the same size range as the
firms surveyed in PACE. All firms performed R&D.
The response rates were 55.6% for the PACE survey
and approximately 70% for the SESSI survey. Non-
response analysis of the PACE results showed no
notable biases by industrial sector, firm size, R&D
intensity, or the position within the firm of the
respondent.
The PACE and SESSI results were carefully
checked to prevent double-counting by deleting cases
that gave results for an entire multi-divisional firm
when results are also available at the division or
line-of-business level. Some of the business units are
substantially smaller than their parent firm. How-
ever, the small units are always linked through own-
ership to their larger parent and consequently the
business environment faced by these units should
differ substantially from that of independent small
firms. For simplicity, the discussion below refers to
each of these business units as a ‘firm’. In total, data
are available for a maximum of 787 firms active in
101 lines of business defined at the four-digit ISIC
. third revision level, though there are only one or
two respondents for 46 of these business lines. The
number of useable firms also varies due to item
non-response, with a maximum of 604 firms avail-
able for sales-weighted estimates of patent propen-
sity rates.
Although MERIT and SESSI collaborated closely
on the development of the two questionnaires, there
are several differences in the types of data collected
and in the format of some of the questions because
of differing objectives for each survey.
4 Due to
confidentiality constraints, there is no data on R&D
expenditures for the French firms and the French
firms can only be classified to the two-digit ISIC
level, with the exception of pharmaceutical firms.
4 A full description of the PACE methodology is available in
. the work of Arundel et al. 1995 . Copies of the PACE and French
questionnaires are available on request from A. Arundel.() A. Arundel, I. KablarResearch Policy 27 1998 127–141 131
Consequently, most results by sector are given at this
level of disaggregation. A few two-digit sectors,
such as textiles and clothing, are combined to in-
crease the number of respondents per sector to a
minimum of five firms.
2.1. Estimating patent propensity
The definition of an innovation is crucial to the
calculation of patent propensity rates. Recent innova-
tion surveys, such as the European Community Inno-
vation Survey, define an innovation to include both
new products and processes that are developed
through the in-house innovative activities of a firm
and new products and processes that are obtained
from sources external to the firm.
5 This definition
of an innovation creates problems for estimates of
patent propensity rates because the same innovation
could be counted more than once. In contrast, the
PACE and SESSI definitions focus on new products
and processes that are developed, at least in part,
through the firm’s own R&D efforts and which are
patented by the firm itself.
The PACE questionnaire defines an innovation as
the commercial introduction of a ‘new or technically
changed product’ or the implementation of ‘im-
proved production methods for existing
products...or for making new products’. The ques-
tionnaire also makes it clear that these innovations
are developed by the innovative activities of the firm
itself. The focus on in-house innovation is explicit in
several questions on patents and implicit throughout
the questionnaire. Explicit questions ask about the
patenting strategies of ‘your unit’s product and pro-
cess innovations’ or about ‘a significant product or
process innovation developed by your unit’. The
implicit focus on in-house innovation begins with the
 second question, which asks the respondent usually
. the R&D manager to give ‘several examples of
products or processes that are an important focus of
innovation in your unit’.
The SESSI questionnaire is slightly different. The
first question asks if the firm has developed or
introduced a technologically innovative product or
5 For an overview of the methodology and results of the CIS
and similar surveys, see the articles in Arundel and Garrelfs
. 1997 .
process. The use of the term ‘introduced’ can refer to
innovations developed outside of the firm. However,
the focus on in-house innovation is apparent through
the placement of the questions on patents, which
immediately follows the first question, and the fre-
quent reference to ‘your new products’ and ‘your
new processes’. The respondent is also asked if their
firm has applied for a patent in each of four loca-
tions. Given the form of the patent questions, it is
unlikely that the SESSI respondents interpret them to
refer to innovations obtained from other firms.
The exact wording of the PACErSESSI question
on patent propensity is ‘‘In the last three years, a
patent application was made for approximately what
percentage of your unit’s product and process inno-
vations?’’
6 The respondent is given five response
options: 0–19%, 20–39%, 40–59%, 60–79%, and
80–100%. The question does not limit the field to
‘patentable’ innovations in order to give a better
estimate of the use of patents to protect the full range
of each firm’s innovations, some of which may not
be patentable but still of expected economic value, as
shown by their commercialisation. The mid-point of
each category is used to calculate patent propensity.
Each firm was also asked to give the total number of
technically unique patents that it had applied for over
the same time period. Firms with no patent applica-
. tions 14.5% of the total are assumed to have
patented zero percent of their innovations over this
three-year period.
The estimated patent propensities are likely to
overestimate the true proportion of innovations that
are protected by patents because the measure of
patent propensity that can be determined from these
results is actually the patent application propensity
rate, although for brevity this is referred to below
simply as the patent propensity rate. Since not all
patent applications are granted, the results overesti-
mate the true patent propensity rate. For example, in
1992, 32% of patent applications to the EPO and
37% of US patent applications were not granted for
. various reasons TSR, 1993 . The patent grant rate
also varies within European countries, which could
influence the incentives to apply for a patent among
firms in the PACErSESSI sample. However, differ-
6 Of course, a firm could apply for more than one patent for an
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ences in national patent systems should not markedly
influence the results because of the size and interna-
tional orientation of the firms in the sample. Almost
. all 93% of the patent-applicant firms had applied
for one or more patents outside their own home
country, either via the EPO system or in the US or
Japan.
The PACErSESSI estimates of patent propensity
rates are limited to the patenting and innovative
activities of Europe’s largest firms. These firms are
responsible for the majority of both R&D and patent
applications within Europe. For example, the firms
included in the survey target population accounted
for a minimum of 77% of all business expenditures
on R&D in the UK. Given the importance of these
firms to European innovation, patent propensity esti-
mates based on this restricted sample are still of
value. However, the degree to which these estimates
could either over- or underestimate the patent
propensity rates when firms of all sizes are included
depends on whether or not patenting activity and the
patent propensity rate varies by firm size and in
which direction, a question which we partly address
below.
The average patent propensity rates by sector are
weighted by an indirect measure of the total number
of innovations developed by each firm. The best
estimate of this number is probably each firm’s
R&D expenditures, under the assumption that the
number of innovations is linearly correlated with the
amount of effort expended on R&D, but this cannot
be done for the whole sample because of the lack of
R&D expenditure data for France. Instead, the an-
nual sales turnover is used. The reliability of sales as
an estimate of innovative effort was tested by corre-
lating estimated sales-weighted and R&D expendi-
ture-weighted patent propensities for 21 sectors with
five or more firms, using an identical set of 396
PACE firms with full data for all necessary vari-
ables. The two sets of estimates are strongly corre-
lated, with R
2 values of 0.92 for product innova-
tions and 0.82 for process innovations.
7 However,
7 The high R2 values are partly explained by controlling for
 large differences in R&D intensities between sectors for example,
. between basic metal and pharmaceutical firms by comparing
R&D weighted results with sales-weighted results within the same
sector.
weighting the results by R&D expenditures pro-
duces a higher patent propensity rate than weightings
based on a firm’s sales.
3. Descriptive results
Table 1 provides estimated patent propensity rates
for sectors with a minimum of five respondent
firms.
8 For all firms, the average sales-weighted
patent propensity is 35.9% for product innovations
and 24.8% for process innovations. The unweighted
patent propensity rates for the identical set of firms
are similar, at 33.0% for product and 20.1% for
process innovations. The sales-weighted patent
propensity for product innovations is highest in sec-
. tors such as pharmaceuticals 79.2% , chemicals
. . 57.3% and machinery 52.4% where patents have
been identified in other studies as an important
method of appropriation and lowest in low-technol-
ogy sectors. These include textiles and clothing with
a patent propensity rate for product innovations of
8.1% and basic metals with a rate of 14.6%.
These sales-weighted patent propensity rates for
Europe are less than the R&D-weighted propensity
. rates reported by Cohen et al. 1996 for the United
States, using an almost identical question, of 51.6%
for product innovations and 33% for process innova-
tions. Part of the difference is due to the different
method of weighting the estimates. R&D-weighted
estimates for European firms, limited to PACE firms,
give patent propensity rates of 43.6% for product
innovations and 25.9% for process innovations. These
are closer to the reported propensity rates for the US
than the sales-weighted estimates, particularly for
product innovations. Other factors could also partly
explain the difference between the American and
European estimates. These include differences in the
sectoral distribution of American and European firms
and the fact that the American study sampled R&D
laboratories while the European study sampled firms.
Table 1 shows that a considerably lower percent-
age of process compared to product innovations are
patented in most sectors. The propensity rate is
approximately equal to or higher for process than for
8 Three sectors do not contain any firms from France: power
utilities, food and tobacco, and transport and telecom services.() A. Arundel, I. KablarResearch Policy 27 1998 127–141 133
Table 1
Patent propensity rates by sector for European firms between 1990 and 1992
Sector ISIC Sales-weighted patent Sales and productrprocess-weighted
. . code Propensity Rates % Propensity Rates %
N Product Process N % Time All
Innovations Innovations on innovation
products Propensity
Mining 10–14 11 27.7 32.5 10 47.9 30.9
Food, beverages and tobacco 15, 16 42 26.1 24.7 41 54.6 25.3
a Textiles, clothing 17, 18 9 8.1 8.1 yy y
Petroleum refining 23 17 22.6 29.0 15 62.4 25.1
Chemicals 24 88 57.3 39.0 65 62.9 57.1
Pharmaceuticals 2423 32 79.2 45.6 13 74.0 74.0
Rubber and plastic products 25 20 33.7 27.6 8 68.9 33.5
Glass, clay, ceramics 26 35 29.3 20.2 20 51.5 31.4
. Basic metals iron and steel 27 13 14.6 15.1 13 46.8 14.9
Fabricated metal products 28 42 38.8 39.4 10 54.9 29.2
Machinery 29 69 52.4 16.3 44 71.5 53.9
Office and computing equip. 30 8 56.8 20.9 y 54.3 y
Electrical equipment 31 26 43.6 21.5 14 61.1 43.0
Communication equipment 32 37 46.6 22.7 22 76.4 36.5
Precision instruments 33 24 56.4 46.8 14 71.0 52.6
Automobiles 34 46 30.0 17.0 31 77.5 25.2
Other transport equipment 35 30 31.2 10.9 20 72.6 17.0
Power utilities 40 14 29.5 26.5 13 33.5 26.7
Transport and telecom services 60, 64 23 20.5 12.4 21 64.5 17.7
Other manufacturing sectors 19 yy 9 yy
All firms 604 35.9 24.8 400 62.9 32.3
aResults not given when there are fewer than five firms per sector or for ‘other manufacturing’, which includes less than five firms each in
footwear, wood products, paper products, publishing, and furniturernec.
product innovations in only five sectors: the mining
industries, textiles and clothing, basic metals,
petroleum refining, and fabricated metal products.
These results are expected because secrecy should be
an effective method of protecting process innova-
tions that are not sold to other firms, while patenting
a process innovation would disclose information that
could be used by competitors in their own manufac-
turing processes. Firms should avoid patenting pro-
cess innovations because of the difficulty in detect-
ing infringement.
The second part of Table 1 gives the estimated
patent propensity for both product and process inno-
vations combined. These estimates are limited to the
PACE firms, where data are available on the percent-
age of time spent by R&D personnel on five activi-
ties, including ‘developing new or improved pro-
cesses’ and ‘developing new or improved products’.
The respondent could fill in any percentage as long
as the sum for all five activities equalled 100%. The
proportion of time spent on product or process inno-
vation is assumed to be correlated with the number
of product and process innovations. For example, we
assume that product innovations will account for
two-thirds of a firm’s total innovations if its R&D
staff spend two-thirds of their time on product inno-
vation. Using this assumption, an average patent
propensity rate is calculated for each firm, using the
proportion of time spent on product and process
activities. This average rate is then weighted by the
firm’s sales.
Column 7 of Table 1 gives the average time spent
by firms in each sector on product innovation out of
the total for product and process innovation com-
bined. One surprising result is the strong emphasis
on product innovation, even in process-based sectors
such as petroleum refining and food and tobacco.
Only three sectors spend more time on process than
product innovation: mining, basic metals, and power
utilities. The productrprocess- and sales-weighted() A. Arundel, I. KablarResearch Policy 27 1998 127–141 134
. Fig. 1. Patent propensity by size class 604 firms .
patent propensity rates for the PACE respondents are
given in column 8 for 17 sectors. Only four sectors
apply for a patent for more than 50% of all of their
. innovations: pharmaceuticals 74.0% , chemicals
. . 57.1% , machinery 53.9% , and precision instru-
. ments 52.6% .
The patent propensity for all firms increases with
the firm’s annual sales, as shown in Fig. 1, up to a
maximum for firms with sales between 750 and 1000
million ECUs, and then declines. This decline is
partly due to sectoral effects. For example, petroleum,
basic metal, and other bulk product firms can have
very high sales but all three are sectors with low
patent propensity rates. This reduces the patent
propensity rate in the largest sales classes. An analy-
sis limited to 95 firms in four high-technology sec-
. tors combined ISIC 30–33 inclusive shows a
monotonic increase in patent propensity rates by
sales class.
4. Econometric analyses
In addition to the observed differences by firm
size and sector, the propensity to patent should vary
by several other factors for which data are available
for the PACErSESSI respondents. A primary influ-
ence is the importance given by each firm to patents
and secrecy as a method for preventing competitors
from copying their innovations. We would expect
patent propensity rates to be higher among firms that
find patents to be a very effective means of prevent-
ing copying and to be lower among firms that find
secrecy to be effective for this purpose.
9 Another
possible factor is the intensity of competition, which
could increase the value of patents. Although there is
no direct measure of the intensity of competition in
the PACErSESSI data, whether or not the firm sells
9 Earlier research using the PACErSESSI data shows that the
most important reason why firms apply for a patent is to prevent
copying and that this reason has the most important impact on the
. propensity to patent Arundel and Kabla, forthcoming . Other
reasons to patent, such as ‘to use the patent in negotiations’ or ‘to
access foreign markets’ also had a positive effect on the patent
propensity rate, but most of these secondary reasons were no
longer significant in analyses that included dummy variables for
industry, with the exception of ‘to access foreign markets’. The
analyses reported in this study use sales in foreign markets as an
alternative.() A. Arundel, I. KablarResearch Policy 27 1998 127–141 135
products in either Japan or the United States is used
as a proxy for exposure to greater competition. We
assume that European firms that market products in
these two countries are exposed to more intense
competition than firms that only sell products within
Europe or other regions. The PACE data also permit
measuring exposure to foreign competition by using
the percentage of sales due to exports. However,
exports were never significant in any of the analyses
and for this reason a variable for exports is not
included in the results given below. The lack of
significance could be due to the fact that it is not
possible to separate exports to other European coun-
tries from exports to the United States, Japan, or
other parts of the world.
Two other possible influences on the patent
propensity rate can only be examined using the
PACE dataset: the importance of earning license
revenue and the firm’s R&D intensity. Firms that
find earning license revenue to be an important goal
for their innovative activities could be more likely to
patent in order to facilitate licensing. R&D intensity
could be positively correlated to the patent propen-
sity rate for several reasons. First, the percentage of
innovations that meet the basic novelty requirements
for a patent could increase with the firm’s R&D
intensity. Second, R&D intensive firms could de-
velop a higher proportion of breakthrough innova-
tions that are rewarded with broader patent width,
which in turn increases the incentive to patent. Third,
Table 2
Ordered logit results for the propensity to patent product innovations
Variable PACE–SESSI date combined PACE data only
123
b SE b SE b SE
Constant I2.572 0.532 I1.945 0.646 I1.481 0.791
Germany 0.641 0.168 0.585 0.179 0.590 0.208
LSALES 0.493 0.096 0.695 0.108 0.613 0.131
PATENTS 1.563 0.176 1.367 0.188 1.501 0.237
SECRECY I0.326 0.152 I0.338 0.160 y0.269 0.198
FORMARKT 1.058 0.204 0.861 0.217 0.800 0.235
LICENSE 0.585 0.352
RDINTENS 0.086 0.336
Transport and telecom services I2.743 0.483 I2.633 0.552
Petroleum refining I2.644 0.665 I2.722 0.721
Basic metals I2.165 0.750 I2.154 0.773
Power utilities I2.088 0.573 I2.122 0.616
Other transport I1.839 0.482 I2.209 0.638
Electrical equipment I1.598 0.603 y1.331 0.772
Fabricated metal products I1.584 0.421 I1.762 0.730
Food, beverages, tobacco I1.570 0.450 I1.641 0.511
Mining I1.542 0.601 I1.907 0.719
Miscellaneous I1.389 0.451 I1.255 0.614
Rubber and plastic products I1.338 0.534 y1.164 0.669
Glass, clay, ceramics I1.320 0.426 y0.985 0.544
Automobiles I1.188 0.400 I1.609 0.504
Chemicals I1.094 0.352 I0.943 0.445
Office and computer equip y0.828 0.529 y0.547 0.612
Precision instruments y0.640 0.581 y0.898 0.688
Machinery y0.457 0.364 y0.292 0.477
Communication equipment y0.388 0.411 y0.339 0.504
Model Chi-square 183.2 p-0.0000 245.1 p-0.0001 193.6 p-0.000
N 567 567 379
The reference sector is pharmaceuticals. The order of the sectors is based on model 2. Coefficients in bold when p-0.05, in italics when
.  .  . p-0.10. The estimated threshold values m not shown in the table are statistically significant p-0.0000 in all models and increase
2 . monotonically. There is no equivalent of a pseudo R for an ordered logit or probit model.() A. Arundel, I. KablarResearch Policy 27 1998 127–141 136
Table 3
. Marginal effects in % for the propensity to patent more than
 20% of product and process innovations for model 1 of Tables 2
. and 4






The marginal effects are computed using the zero value as the
reference for the dummy variables and the sample mean as the
reference for LSIZE.
a higher development cost for innovations in R&D
intensive firms could be linked to the use of patents
as an appropriation mechanism.
All regressions include a dummy control variable
for location in Germany because of the earlier find-
ing that German firms consistently patent a higher
percentage of their innovations than firms in other
 European countries Arundel and Kabla, forthcom-
. ing . The dummy variables for the importance of
. . patents PATENTS and secrecy SECRECY to pre-
vent copying and the importance of earning license
. revenue as a goal of innovation LICENSE are
Table 4
Ordered logit results for the propensity to patent process innovations
Variable PACE-SESSI data combined PACE data only
123
b SE b SE b SE
Constant I2.925 0.559 I2.710 0.671 I2.697 0.814
Germany 0.471 0.176 0.537 0.185 0.442 0.212
LSALES 0.535 0.101 0.627 0.108 0.634 0.134
PATENTS 1.485 0.179 1.454 0.186 1.204 0.225
SECRECY 0.377 0.166 0.325 0.171 0.299 0.215
FORMARKT 0.363 0.207 0.203 0.232 0.307 0.252
LICENSE 0.703 0.411
RDINTENS 0.189 0.118
Transport and telecom services I1.942 0.515 I1.606 0.602
Automobiles I1.140 0.438 y0.815 0.518
Office and computer equipment y0.909 0.565 y0.204 0.663
Miscellaneous y0.856 0.505 y0.549 0.658
Other transport y0.824 0.467 y0.530 0.600
Basic metals y0.626 0.826 y0.424 0.677
Machinery y0.595 0.383 y0.189 0.484
Electrical equipment y0.583 0.518 y0.095 0.695
Mining y0.522 0.644 y0.732 0.757
Petroleum refining y0.514 0.506 y0.430 0.632
Food, beverages, tobacco y0.458 0.448 y0.295 0.498
Precision instruments y0.368 0.550 y0.535 0.657
Rubber and plastic products y0.320 0.572 0.288 0.734
Power utilities y0.290 0.546 y0.113 0.653
Glass, clay, ceramics y0.244 0.454 0.065 0.582
Communication equipment y0.222 0.427 y0.596 0.565
Fabricated metal products y0.195 0.399 y0.049 0.746
Chemicals y0.185 0.362 0.239 0.449
Model Chi-square 151.4 p-0.0001 176.1 p-0.0001 114.6 p-0.0001
N 567 567 377
The reference sector is pharmaceuticals. The order of the sectors is based on model 2. Coefficients in bold when p-0.05, in italics when
.  .  . p-0.10. The estimated threshold values m not shown in the table are statistically significant p-0.0000 in all models and increase
2 . monotonically. There is no equivalent of a pseudo R for an ordered logit or probit model.() A. Arundel, I. KablarResearch Policy 27 1998 127–141 137
based on separate questions for product and process
innovations. For example, the variable PATENTS in
the analyses of the patent propensity rate for product
innovations is equal to 1 when the firm reports that
product patents are a ‘very’ or ‘extremely’ impor-
tant method of protecting innovations from copying
. and zero otherwise , while the variable refers to
process patents in the analyses of the propensity rate
for process innovations.
The PACErSESSI data for patent propensity are
based on six ordinal categories: zero percent of
innovations patented plus five percentage classes of
20%. In this context, the propensity to patent is a
latent variable because its exact value is unknown.
The appropriate econometric model is to use an
. ordered logit or probit model. It is also possible to
use an ordered probit with known thresholds, since
the boundaries between each category are known.
Both econometric techniques were used: an ordered
 probit with known thresholds for five classes the
. zero category was combined with the 0–20% class ,
and an ordered logit without thresholds using the
zero category plus five classes. The two methods
give essentially identical results, with only a few
differences in the significance or nonsignificance of
some of the dummy variables for industrial sector.
For simplicity, only the results of the simple ordered




Table 2 gives ordered logit model results for the
propensity to patent product innovations. The first
two models include data for France and therefore do
. not include R&D intensity RDINTENS or the
importance of earning revenue from licensing prod-
. uct innovations LICENSE , since these two vari-
ables are not available for French firms.
Location in Germany, as expected, is significant
in all regressions, with the coefficient varying very
little. Firm size, measured by the log of sales at the
. business unit level, where applicable LSALES , is
positive and significant in all regressions. Table 3
gives the marginal effects, calculated at the means,
for model 1. The marginal effect for a one-unit
 change in the log of firm sales in model 1 with
. mean sales of 315 million ECUs is a 12.3% increase
in the probability that the firm patents over 20% of
its product innovations.
Firms that find patents to be a ‘very’ or ‘ex-
tremely’ effective method to deter or prevent com-
petitors from copying product innovations
. PATENTS are significantly more likely to patent
more of their product innovations than firms that do
not find patents as effective for this purpose. As
expected, firms that find secrecy an effective means
to prevent the copying of product innovations are
less likely to patent more of their product innova-
tions, although the coefficient is not significant in the
analysis limited to the PACE data only. A compari-
son of the marginal effects for model 1 shows that
the importance of patents has a considerably larger
impact than secrecy. Firms that find product patents
of importance are 38.9% more likely to patent more
than 20% of their innovations, while firms that find
secrecy of importance are only 8.1% less likely to
patent over 20% of their innovations.
10
Firms that sell products in either the US or Japan
. FORMARKT are significantly more likely to patent
a higher percentage of their product innovations than
firms that do not sell products in either of these two
markets. The goal of earning license revenue from
product innovations is only significant at the 10%
level, as shown in regression 3, while the R&D
intensity of the firm has no effect on the propensity
to patent product innovations.
10 The accuracy of these results depends on the accuracy with
which the separate effect of patents and secrecy can be measured.
This accuracy can be weakened in two ways. The first is related to
the questionnaire design, in which the question for secrecy closely
follows the question on patents. We would expect the score for
patents and secrecy to be strongly negatively correlated. However,
analyses of groups of subjective questions shows that the re-
sponses are not completely independent. For example, a respon-
dent who gives a score of ‘5’ out of a five-point scale is more
likely to give a score of ‘4’ to questions that follow closely after
than a score of ‘1’. In the PACE and SESSI questionnaires, the
question on patents is in first place while the question on secrecy
is in third place. Second, the respondents could mentally evaluate
the effectiveness of patents in comparison to the effectiveness of
. secrecy or other protection methods . Since the questions are
subjective, rather than based on quantitative measures, there is no
absolute benchmark for measurement.() A. Arundel, I. KablarResearch Policy 27 1998 127–141 138
All of the coefficients for each industrial sector in
models 2 and 3 are negative because the reference
sector is pharmaceuticals, which has the highest
patent propensity rate.
11 As shown, there are signifi-
cant differences in patent propensity rates between
many sectors compared to pharmaceuticals.
5.2. Process innoÍations
The results for the propensity to patent process
innovations are given in Table 4. The marginal
effects for model 1 are also given in column 3 of
Table 3. There are several notable changes in the
results for process innovations compared to product
innovations. First, the variable SECRECY is no
longer negative in any of the regressions. Instead, it
is positive and statistically significant in model 1 and
positive and of borderline significance in model 2,
when we would expect the propensity to patent
process innovations to strongly decline with the im-
portance of secrecy to prevent copying. One explana-
tion of this unexpected result is that secrecy and
patents are not alternatives for the protection of
process inventions, but complementary, in the sense
that there could be a qualitative difference in the
type of process innovations that are protected by
secrecy versus patents. Second, the significance of
sales in foreign markets is considerably lower for
process compared to product innovations. It is only
of borderline significance in model 1, where ps
0.08. This suggests that process patents are not very
important to the ability to compete abroad on the
basis of price, possibly because process innovations
can be more readily protected through other means.
Finally, there are far fewer statistically significant
differences by sector for process innovations than for
product innovations. This suggests that most of the
sectoral differences in patent propensity rates, once
controlling for other factors, are limited to product
innovations. Differences in propensity rates for pro-
cess innovations can be explained by a few firm-
specific factors such as firm size and the importance
of process patents to prevent copying.
11 The sector results do not include textiles and clothing, as in
Table 1, because there is not enough variation in the dependent
variable for the analyses based on the PACE data only.
6. Conclusions
The estimated patent propensity rates for Euro-
pean firms in the early 1990s are slightly lower than
roughly comparable rates for the United States.
However, both the recent European and American
data provide patent propensity rates that are consid-
erably lower than the rates determined by Mansfield.
We do not know if this is due to a real change in the
propensity to patent or to differences in how Mans-
field selected firms to interview.
The lower patent propensity rates in Europe com-
pared to the US in the early 1990s could be due to a
range of reasons. One possibility is the lower costs
of applying for a patent in the US compared to
Europe, both in terms of the actual application fees
and in terms of the relative market size per unit
application cost. The cost of a US patent in the early
1990s, including the fees of a patent attorney, was
approximately 3000 ECUs, or one-third of the cost
of an EPO patent valid in France, the UK, and
. Germany Patent World, 1995 . This cost difference
could lead American firms to patent a higher per-
centage of innovations where the patent only pro-
vides a marginal benefit. Another possible cause is
the effect of the changes to the US patent system in
1982 that strengthened the ability of firms to protect
. their patents from infringement Lerner, 1995 , which
could have increased the value of patents.
An important conclusion that can be drawn from
these results concerns the common use of patents to
measure innovativeness or to compare the innovative
 output of sectors or countries European Commis-
. sion, 1994 . Both the wide range in patent propensity
rates, varying from a low of 17.7% in transport and
telecom services to a high of 74% in pharmaceuticals
for the sales and productrprocess weighted esti-
mates, and the low rate in many sectors, indicates
that great caution must be taken when using patents
as a measure of innovative output, particularly when
these rates are adjusted downwards by another 30%
to account for the percentage of patent applications
that are rejected or withdrawn.
Patents are a particularly poor measure of innova-
tiveness in sectors such as food and tobacco,
petroleum refining, basic metals, automobiles, and
other transport equipment. In these sectors, the large
majority of innovations are not patented. Patents() A. Arundel, I. KablarResearch Policy 27 1998 127–141 139
could still be used to compare the innovativeness of
firms within specific sectors if the most economi-
cally valuable patents were still patented. However,
we do not know if this is true or not. There are also
problems of a different type with the use of patents
as a measure of innovativeness in the chemical and
pharmaceutical sectors, where the majority of inno-
vations are patented. It is common for firms in these
sectors to apply for a large number of multiple
patents in order to build a protective wall around a
single new chemical of commercial significance
. Cook et al., 1991 . This means that we must assume
that such multiple patenting is randomly distributed
in order to be able to use simple patent counts as a
measure of innovative activity. A more accurate
picture of innovativeness, used by Sharp and Patel
. 1997 for the pharmaceutical sector, can be obtained
by using several indicators in addition to patent
counts, such as the number of chemicals under de-
velopment, R&D expenditures, and the number of
the 50 top-selling products owned by each firm.
The regression results show that the patent
propensity rate for both product and process innova-
tions increase with firm size. This indicates that the
PACErSESSI patent propensity rates, based on Eu-
 rope’s largest firms although many of the divisions
. are much smaller , will overestimate patent propen-
sity rates for the entire population of firms, although
very small firms, none of which are included in this
survey, could have higher patent propensity rates.
Neither the degree to which the PACErSESSI re-
sults overestimate patent propensities, or underesti-
mate them if there is significant patenting activity by
very small firms, is likely to be substantial however,
since the PACErSESSI survey encompasses the ma-
jority of both sales and R&D expenditures by inno-
vative European firms.
The regression results also provide some evidence
to show that large R&D intensive firms do not
patent a higher percentage of their innovations than
large firms with low R&D intensities. This indicates
that there is little difference in the value of patents to
firms of different R&D intensities. One explanation
is that the patenting strategies of large firms, other
things being equal, are similar. This could be be-
cause they share similar R&D cultures and access to
in-house patent departments. Other analyses of the
PACE data, for example, show that a large R&D
unit in the food sector behaves similarly to a large
R&D unit in the electronics industry, even though
these two sectors have very different R&D intensi-
. ties Arundel et al., 1995 . The implication is that
there is no need for policies to strengthen patenting
as part of a general framework to assist the innova-
tive capabilities of large R&D intensive firms. Of
course, conditions could differ considerably among
small independent firms.
The regression results for process innovations
suggest that sectoral effects are less important than
firm-level characteristics, such as firm size. In con-
trast with the results for product innovations, there
are very few significant differences by sector, while
firm size is consistently positive and significant for
the propensity to patent both product and process
innovations. The latter is not an intuitively obvious
result. Large firms, as suggested by Cohen and Klep-
. per 1996 , should invest more effort in process
innovation than small firms because they are able to
spread the development costs over an increasingly
large output. Yet, large firms should also be more
likely to only use their process innovations in their
own production lines, whereas smaller firms may
need to sell or license their process innovations in
order to recoup their development costs. One would
therefore expect large firms to be less likely than
small firms to patent process innovations because of
concern over the disclosure of information to com-
petitors. The fact that this does not happen suggests
that other factors are influencing the decision of
large firms to patent process innovations. One possi-
bility is that large firms are more likely than small
firms to patent routinely, rather than carefully evalu-
ating the need to patent each innovation, as sug-
gested in a study of patenting among Dutch firms
. Arundel et al., 1997 . This effect was linked to the
presence of in-house patent expertise which reduced
the cost of applying for a patent. A similar result was
. reported by Scherer 1965 who found that the num-
ber of patents held by a firm was more highly
correlated with an estimate of the number of in-house
attorneys than with the number of R&D employees.
Another possible explanation is that large firms are
better able than small firms to enforce their patents,
even when their potential area of use, the production
line of competitors, should largely be hidden from
scrutiny.() A. Arundel, I. KablarResearch Policy 27 1998 127–141 140
Acknowledgements
The PACE survey was funded by DG XIII of the
European Commission. We would like to thank Wes
Cohen for permission to report some results from a
survey of American firms and we thank both Wes
Cohen and Frederick Scherer for comments on ear-
lier versions of this paper.
Appendix A
The ordered logit model can be used to examine
the impact of a range of exogeneous variables on a
dependent variable which takes a finite set of or-
. dered values, without a loss of generality 1,2... n .
The model assumes that the dependent variable y is
generated by a continuous latent variable y) whose
. values are unobserved Greene, 1993, Liao, 1994 .
The model assumes that there are a set of ordered
. values r1,r2,...,rny1 and a variable y) such
that:
ys1i f y)-r1
ysk if rky1-y)-rk for 1-k-n 1 .
ysn if rny1-y).
The unobserved variable y) is modelled as a
. linear function of the N,k vector of exogeneous
variables X:
y )sbX q« is1,...,N,2 . ii i
where « has a distribution function f derived from i
the logistic cumulative distribution function:
Fxs1r 1qe
yx .3 .  .  .
Given the characteristics X of individual i, the i
probability that y is found in category k is: i
Prob Y s1rXi sFr 1ybX . . ii
Prob Y skrXi sFr k ybX .  . ii
4 .
yFr k y1 ybX . . i
Prob Y snrXi s1yFr n y1 ybX . . . ii
The method of estimation is maximum likelihood.
References
Acs, Z.J., Audretsch, D.B., 1988. Innovation in large and small
firms: an empirical analysis. Am. Econ. Rev. 78, 678–690.
. Arundel, A., Garrelfs, R. Eds. , 1997. Innovation Measurement
and Policies. European Commission, Luxembourg, EIMS pub-
lication 50.
Arundel, A., van de Paal, G., Soete L., 1995. Innovation Strate-
gies of Europe’s Largest Industrial Firms. MERIT, Maastricht.
Arundel, A., Demandt, I., Steinmueller, E., Malo, S., 1997. New
Developments in Patenting and Dutch SMEs. Merit Research
Memorandum, MERIT, Maastricht.
Arundel, A., Kabla, I., forthcoming. Patenting strategies of Euro-
pean firms: an analysis of survey data. In: Allegrezza, S.,
. Serbat, H. Eds. , The Econometrics of Patents. Applied
Econometrics Association Series, Paris.
Cohen, W., Klepper, S., 1996. Firm size and the nature of
innovation within industries: the case of process and product
R&D. The Review of Economics and Statistics, pp. 232–243.
Cohen, W., Nelson, R.R., Walsh, J., 1996. Appropriability condi-
tions and why firms patent and why they do not in the
American manufacturing sector. Paper presented to the Con-
ference on New S and T Indicators for the Knowledge Based
Economy, OECD, Paris, June 19–21.
Cook, T., Doyle, C., Jabbari, D., 1991. Pharmaceuticals and the
Law. Stockton Press, New York.
Devinny, T., 1993. How well do patents measure new product
activity? Economic Letters 41, 447–450.
Duguet, E., Kabla, I., forthcoming. Appropriation strategy and the
motivations to use the patent system: an econometric analysis
at the firm level. Ann. INSEE.
EPO, 1994. Utilisation of Patent Protection in Europe, Eposcript,
Vol. 3. European Patent Office, Munich.
European Commission, 1994. The European Report on Science
and Technology Indicators. European Commission, Brussels.
European Commission, 1996. Green Paper on Innovation. Euro-
pean Commission, Luxembourg.
Evenson, R.E., 1993. Patents, R&D, and invention potential:
international evidence. AEA Pap. Proc. 83, 463–468.
Greene, W.H., 1993. Econometric Analysis, 2nd edn. Macmillan,
New York.
Grefermann, K., Oppenlander, K.H., Peffgen, E., Rothlingshofer, ¨¨ ¨
K., Scholz, L., 1974. Patentwesen und technischer Fortschritt,
Vol. 1. Verlag Otto Schwartz, Gottingen. ¨
Grilliches, Z., 1990. Patent statistics as economic indicators: a
survey. J. Econ. Literature 28, 1661–1707.
Harabi, N., 1995. Appropriability of technical innovations: an
empirical analysis. Res. Policy 24, 981–992.
Harter, J.F.R., 1993. The propensity to patent with differentiated
products. South. Econ. J. 61, 195–200.
Horstman, I., MacDonald, G.M., Slivinski, A., 1985. Patents as
. information transfer mechanisms: to patent or maybe not to
patent. J. Political Econ. 93, 837–858.
Kabla, I., 1996. The patent as indicator of innovation. INSEE
Studies Econ. Stat. 1, 56–71.
Kortum, S., Lerner, J., 1997. Stronger protection or technological() A. Arundel, I. KablarResearch Policy 27 1998 127–141 141
revolution: what is behind the recent surge in patenting?,
NBER Working Paper 6204, NBER, Cambridge.
Lerner, J., 1995. Patenting in the shadow of competitors. J. Law
Econ. 38, 463–495.
Levin, R.C., Klevorick, A.K., Nelson, R.R., Winter, S.G., 1987.
Appropriating the returns from industrial research and devel-
opment. Brookings Pap. Econ. Activity 3, 242–279.
Liao, T.F., 1994. Interpreting Probability Models: Logit, Probit,
and Other Generalized Linear Models. Sage Publications, Lon-
don.
Licht, G., Zoz, K., 1996. Patents and R&D: an econometric
investigation using applications for German, European, and
US patents by German companies. ZEW Discussion Paper
96-19, Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung,
Mannheim.
Mansfield, E., 1986. Patents and innovation: an empirical study.
Manage. Sci. 32, 173–181.
Patent World, 1995. Cost of Patenting in Europe. Patent World,
JunerJuly, pp. 26–30.
Scherer, F.M., 1965. Firm size, market structure, opportunity, and
the output of patented inventions. Am. Econ. Rev., December,
1097–1125.
Scherer, F.M., 1983. The propensity to patent. Int. J. Ind. Org. 1,
107–128.
Sharp, M., Patel, P., 1997. Europe’s pharmaceutical industry: an
. innovation profile. In: Arundel, A., Garrelfs, R. Eds. , Inno-
vation Measurement and Policies. European Commission,
Luxembourg, EIMS publication 50.
Taylor, C.T., Silberston, Z.A., 1973. The Economic Impact of the
Patent System: a Study of the British Experience. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
. TSR Trilateral Statistical Report , 1993. Trilateral Statistical Re-
port 1993. European Patent Office, Munich.